Coverage Consideration For Tyler Herro And Bam Adebayo, Boston's Heads Up Zone Approach And The Pythagorean Problem

The Boston Celtics lead the series, 1-0, with Game 2 coming up Wednesday at 7 pm before things shift to Miami for Game 3 Saturday at 6pm.

SINGLE COVERAGE

The Boston Celtics took Game 1 of this First Round series in decisive fashion, leading wire-to-wire and by more than 30 for a stretch. But as is so often the case with series openers, the final score is far less instructive than the tape. There’s no doubt Miami is fighting an uphill battle in this series, especially without Jimmy Butler and Terry Rozier and with Duncan Robinson (15 minutes) limited, but for all of Boston’s offensive firepower it’s how they’re choosing to defend Bam Adebayo and Tyler Herro that may be the most interesting early notes.

The story of the past couple months for Miami has been more and more teams following the examples set by teams like Dallas and New York and their defensive schemes, either sending doubles at Adebayo and Jimmy Butler or loading up early help on their post-ups and isolations across the lane. Some of what made those tactical decisions was the sometimes awkward spacing with Adebayo and Butler on the court together, but the Celtics have rarely schemed the HEAT in such a fashion, opting for years to trust their individual defenders while staying home everywhere else as much as possible.

As expected, they’re treating Adebayo much as they always have. Boston will bring a third player into the lane to ensure he doesn’t get a free roll to the rim, but with both Kristaps Porzingis and Al Horford in drop coverage the Celtics appear willing to concede the occasional pocket pass at the elbows or on the baseline out of an empty-corner set. Most crucially, on Adebayo’s one-on-one forays, either isolations or post-ups which often end up being the same things logged differently in various databases, there is no help coming. Adebayo attacking Horford looks the same as it did two years ago, and the same is true of the Porzingis matchup.

“I came into the game being aggressive,” Adebayo said. “That’s it. If you’re not going to double me, I’m going to try and go score.”

It’s important to note that these are not bad matchups for Adebayo. His repertoire – every pivot and fake and spin and reverse you can imagine – has evolved to the point where he can create a look against most anyone. He’s scored on both defenders before, and he can do it at volume – he produced a respectable 10 points on 10 combined isolation and post-up possessions in Game 1, per Second Spectrum’s tracking data. They are also inherently static possessions, the rest of the Boston’s defense locked in on their men, and Adebayo’s comfort zone is more in the upper paint than in consistently getting right to the rim against defenders with size playing a foot or two back.

Why this might be so crucial in this series is because of how much more Miami requires shot creation from Adebayo without other on-ball options in Butler and Rozier. In the past, with Butler soaking up postseason-level usage, Adebayo could shoulder the burden for bursts, going at Horford for four straight minutes in a third quarter on the road, a change-of-pace to keep the offensive train on the tracks. But with injuries being what they are and Miami’s creation options depleted as a result, more is required. Using Sunday’s numbers as an example, a point-per-possession while you’re trying to hold a lead late in a game is different than a point-per-possession when you’re down double digits and the offense has already been pushed off the arc and away from the rim.

“I have a lot of thoughts on that end,” Erik Spoelstra said. “You have to give them credit for taking us out of some things. I think they’re willing to live with some of those one-on-ones to be able to keep bodies on some of our other guys.”

The question, then, is how efficient Adebayo will have to be with his one-on-one work to force an adjustment from Boston, or if that limit even exists. Boston didn’t bring a ton of doubles this season, but they weren’t bottom of the league. If Adebayo scores on five straight isolations at some point in this series, will Boston change its coverage, even if only temporarily? Any avenue toward tilting the defense, any option for getting two defenders on the ball, is one worth exploring, but it’s also difficult to spend long stretches searching for those answers when you need immediate production as you try and keep up with a dynamic offense.

One positive in all of this is that if Miami can force clutch minutes in this series, Boston’s predilection for single coverage means Adebayo should have straightforward shot creation opportunities available to him in moments when any good, comfortable shot has greater value – when single-shot percentages can carry more weight than big picture efficiency. If Adebayo has the opportunity to create and take two ~45 percent shots to take a lead in the final minute of a playoff game against a 64-win team, that’s something everyone would probably be happy with. Whether or not Boston would change their first, second and third quarter philosophies in those situations remains to be seen.

On the other side of the high-usage coin is Herro, who has the unenviable task of being the lead ballhandler going up against a team replete with strong individual defenders. As Herro does not lean toward one-on-one play as heavily as his All-Star teammates – he uses about a quarter as many isolations as Butler, half as many as Adebayo – Boston’s core scheme is more about the pick-and-roll game.

Here's the stat to know. In Game 1 Herro ran 20 pick-and-rolls and 10 handoffs. Of those 30 actions, he only shot the ball, turned the ball over a total of nine times, about a 30 percent usage rate, down from a 40 percent usage rate on his own actions during the regular season. Some of that is Herro having more playmaking responsibility with who is currently available, some of that dealing with two guards, in Jrue Holiday and Derrick White, who double as two of the best screen navigators in the league. When your defender can consistently skinny up and around picks and is always on your tail, it’s tough to find comfortable space.

But Herro has seen defenders like these before, and he’s certainly seen drop coverage like this before. No matter how well Holiday and White are fighting through screens, Adebayo is a good enough screener to create space for Herro to get into the space created by the coverage. If that’s all it was, Herro would be able to get to the same shots he was getting in last week’s Play In games against Philadelphia and Chicago.

Boston, however, isn’t defending Herro’s pick-and-rolls two-on-two as a team like Milwaukee would have done in the past. While they’re staying home on Adebayo’s isolations and post-ups, there’s a clear third defender pinching in at the elbow, not always to get in front of the ball but to be enough of a nuisance to force Herro to pick it up, turning what could have been a shorter floater, or even a layup, into a tight window for a long jumper.

It’s a similar idea to how Miami defends so many guards, with their coverage of Trae Young in the playoffs a couple seasons ago a well-known example. Boston’s intention, then, appears to be to make Herro more of a playmaker, Adebayo more of a scorer.

“[They were] just applying pressure and making things difficult,” Herro said. “Not allowing me to get comfortable really from the beginning.”

Whether or not Spoelstra and his staff are happy to live with what Boston is happy to give up remains to be seen. Miami had less than two days between their win-or-go-home game against Chicago Friday and an afternoon game Sunday in Boston, so with a couple days off before Wednesday’s matchup they’ll have the opportunity to reassess. For now it’s only important to note how Adebayo and Herro are being defended within the context of who is available, because whether or not those coverages change could define both this series and the developmental tracks for both players moving forward.

ZONED OUT

We had a pretty good idea going into this one that Boston was going to be a tough team to zone. They almost always have five good-to-great shooters on the floor, for one, but they also don’t panic against the coverage, avoiding most of the pratfalls which plague other teams. There’s a reason Miami only used their change-of-pace scheme for 15 possessions across three games with Boston.

But zone has been Miami’s primary look when Adebayo rests, their way of keeping the ball out of the paint while they capitalize on the five-out spacing provided by Kevin Love on the other. They don’t necessarily need it, but it’s not a luxury, either. The zone, and the clock-killing full-court pressure that comes with it, is part of their identity. Yet in Game 1 Miami used just nine possessions of zone, as logged by Synergy Sports, and Boston produced 1.55 points-per against it.

Some of what was just Porzingis being a tough player to zone, his ability to shoot in the middle of the floor drawing attention – and creating space for others – where Miami might otherwise be happy to leave a less efficient center to work.

At other times Boston opted to attack out of the wings and corners, Jayson Tatum posting up the low man of the zone and forcing two to the ball as Sam Hauser reaped the benefits on the weakside.

“Last year it was a lot easier because they didn’t have Porzingis and I think our zone made a lot of problems for them,” Nikola Jovic said. “It can make a lot of problems this year too but with Porzingis in the lineup, who can stretch the floor and shoot it over anyone, it’s just really hard to guard him. Sam Hauser shot all those threes off great ball movement they had.”

But what was most interesting about Boston’s zone approach, and this is a benefit to having so many reliable ballhandlers in the rotation, is that they treated Miami’s full-court press as part of that zone rather than an initial level to beat. Most teams focus on the press break to ensure they get the ball across the halfcourt line before eight seconds elapse, and then they go into their zone offense. The Celtics, meanwhile, were getting into their zone offense as they broke the press, putting players into optimal positions before the zone could congeal into its intended shape.

As with Boston’s three-point heavy approach they’re always susceptible to a cold spell, but as much as Miami’s zone allows threes it’s not intended to allow open, ball-movement-derived three. The HEAT want to induce against-the-clock stagnation, and if Boston’s strategy make the secondary scheme unviable that’s a significant blow to Miami’s arsenal. Keep an eye on how much zone the HEAT use in Game 2, as well as the minutes distribution between Love and Jovic – Miami went to some small-ball looks – at the backup center spot.

THE PYTHAGOREAN PROBLEM

Miami was at a math disadvantage in the first half, getting outscored by 27 points at the three-point line not just because they had only made three but they had also attempted just 14 from the arc while Boston was 12-of-30. That’s not going to be a winning formula, especially when you aren’t compensating with rim attempts (seven in the first half) or free-throws (six for both the half and the game). With Boston also winning the turnover column (only three) and collecting a handful of offensive boards to give them seven more field-goal attempts, that’s trouble.

The second half was much more manageable, Miami taking 23 threes to Boston’s 19, attempting six more shots overall. Boston still attempted 12 more threes overall, Miami at 43 percent frequency from the arc and Boston at 53 percent, but the HEAT earning more and more catch-and-shoot looks as the game wore on is a good sign. Granted some of those came from Delon Wright with Boston giving him space to shoot – there’s no easy way to look this up, but Wright has to be one of the first 30+ year olds to match his previous career high in threes, five, in a single postseason quarter as he did in the fourth – but with Porzingis and Horford sometimes assigned to Wright, Caleb Martin or Jaime Jaquez Jr. in order to help off into the paint, Miami is going to need some threes from low-to-medium volume shooters.

“That was pretty crazy,” Wright said. “I don’t think I’ve ever hit that many in a row. I just have to take the open shots they give me.”

Still, you might not see Miami take 14 or fewer threes in a half very often going forward. Whether or not they’ll take more threes, or if they should even be trying to take more, than Boston is an entirely different question. The HEAT’s ability to scale up their three-point volume has been a topic since preseason, and though they were rarely healthy enough – Rozier would certainly help in this category – to get a real sense of what their true shot profile should look like, the fact is that Boston averaged 42 attempts per game and Miami only attempted 40 threes nine times all season.

There’s a real danger in trying to force shots you aren’t comfortable with. As much as Miami will want to keep their volume at a decent pace, pushing too hard in a direction that isn’t natural for the personnel on hand can also take you out of your game. Boston has so many shooters, and can tilt the defense by going matchup hunting consistently enough, that they are going to get their looks, with Miami’s defense having a say in how contested those looks are. Trying to beat a historically great offense at their own math game by trying to outdo their idealized shot profile sounds like trying to sprint through quicksand. The better path is to play your own game, and Miami’s second half, with a 116.7 Offensive Rating, was procedurally closer to it.

TIDBITS

-Keep an eye on how much help Jaime Jaquez Jr. is drawing in Game 2. He scored 16 points on 8-of-16 shooting against mostly single coverage, with Boston failing to stop the ball on one coast-to-coast drive and losing him on another rim cut, but there were hints of help coming his way in the second half that we might see more of going forward. Granted some of that may be Holiday using the defensive freedom granted to him, but Jaquez Jr. had a usage rate of 25 percent and has often been used as a secondary creator since Butler’s knee injury. When you have the ball in your hands that much, defenses start thinking about adjustments.

-Both teams turned in below-average drives, only 34 for a Miami team that averaged 50.8 per 100 possessions, 30 for a Boston team that averaged 40 per 100. Not super surprising, given the quality and styles of defenses, and the fact that this was a very slow-paced game at just 88 possessions apiece.

-In addition to Jovic at center, we also saw some Adebayo-Love minutes in the fourth quarter when Miami was trying to cut into the lead. That pairing was +3 in 4.5 minutes.

-Boston did not run much this season, playing in transition only 14 percent of the time, but that frequency dropped to 5.7 percent in Game 1. Miami’s press and their own low turnover rate likely influenced that, but the cost – transition defense and offensive glass crash rate are always linked – may have been just five offensive boards to call their own.